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Abstract
According to one antitheist argument, the necessarily omniscient, necessarily
omnipotent, and necessarily omnibenevolent Anselmian God does not exist, because
if God is necessarily omnipotent it is impossible for Him to comprehend fully
certain concepts, such as fear, frustration and despair, that an omniscient being
needs to possess. Torin Alter examines this argument and provides three elaborate
objections to it. I argue that theists would not accept any of them because they
conict with traditional Judaeo-Christian doctrines concerning divine attributes.
Torin Alter1 attempts to undermine an argument against the Anselmian
notion of God, according to which God is necessarily omniscient, necessarily
omnipotent and necessarily omnibenevolent. The argument states that if God is
necessarily omnipotent thenHe cannot be omniscient because suchnecessary om-
nipotence precludes Him from having the experiences that are needed to acquire
certain concepts.2 Alter provides three elaborate objections to this antitheist argu-
ment, all of which are, he claims, `consistent with the principal divine attributes'
(pp. 47, 48). However, in the following, I demonstrate that even if Alter's ob-
jections are cogent, they are inconsistent with attributes that are traditionally
ascribed to God, and hence Judaeo-Christian theism is not saved.
1 The Antitheist Argument
The version of concept empiricism upon which the antitheist argument rests
can be formulated as follows:
1. Torin Alter (2002), `On Two Alleged Conicts Between Divine Attributes', Faith and
Philosophy 19, pp. 4757.
2. This antitheist argument is most notably introduced in David Blumenfeld (1978), `On
the Compossibility of the Divine Attributes', Philosophical Studies 34, pp. 91103. Alter also
examines another argument in the same vein: God cannot know what it is like to have an evil
desire, because He, who is necessarily omnibenevolent, cannot have an evil desire. Since this
argument is parallel to the argument at issue, I set it aside in the main text. Variations of these
arguments are discussed in: Richard Francks (1979), `Omniscience, Omnipotence and Pantheism',
Philosophy 54, pp. 395399, Patrick Grim (1983), `Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience',
American Philosophical Quarterly 20, pp. 265276, Patrick Grim (1985), `Against Omniscience:
The Case from Essential Indexicals', Noûs 19, pp. 151180, Patrick Grim (2000), `The Being That
Knew Too Much', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47, pp. 141154, Norman
Kretzmann (1966), `Omniscience and Immutability', Journal of Philosophy 63, pp. 409421,
John Lachs (1963), `Omniscience', Dialogue 1, pp. 400402, John Lachs (1963), `Professor Prior
on Omnisceince', Philosophy 37, pp. 361364, William J. Mander (2002), `Does God KnowWhat
It Is Like to Be Me?', Heythrop Journal 43, pp. 43044, Yujin Nagasawa (2003), `God's Point of
View: A Reply to Mander', The Heythrop Journal 44, pp. 6063, Yujin Nagasawa (forthcoming),
`Divine Omniscience and Knowledge De Se', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion,
and Marcel Sarot (1991), `Omniscience and Experience', International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 30, pp. 89102.
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(P) For any s, s fully comprehends the concepts fear, frustration, and despair
only if s has actually experienced fear, frustration and despair.3
The antitheist argument uses (P) to derive the inconsistency between necessary
omniscience and necessary omnipotence. If God is omniscient then He has to un-
derstand all concepts fully. However, given (P), one's full understanding of such
concepts as fear, frustration, and despair requires one to experience fear, frus-
tration and despair, respectively. However, God cannot have those experiences
because, by denition, He is necessarily omnipotent and so could not fall prey to
the weakness entailed by the having of such experiences. Therefore, the argument
concludes, the Anselmian God does not exist. Notice that in order to establish the
argument antitheists have to hold that (P) is a necessary truth. For, if (P) were
merely contingently true then an omnipotent God could bring it about that (P) is
false and the antitheist argument would immediately become unsound.4
3. In the second section of his paperAlter remarks that (P) seems to gain support fromFrank
Jackson's Knowledge Argument against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness
(p. 4950). This remark is, however, perplexing because, as is shown by the passage from
Jackson that Alter himself quotes in his paper (p. 53), Jackson explicitly rejects concept empiricism
like (P) for the exact same reason that Alter does. Jackson thinks that concept empiricism is
untenable because, as Alter argues in his third objection, one may understand such concepts
as fear, frustration and despair without actually experiencing them if one acquires relevant
false memory traces. See Frank Jackson (1998), `Postscript on Qualia', in Mind, Method, and
Conditionals: Selected Essays, New York, Routledge, pp. 7679. See especially p. 77.
4. This statement is based on the assumption that God is omnipotent if and only if, roughly
speaking, He can do everything that it is possible to do andHe cannot do that which it is necessarily
impossible to do. However, some philosophers argue that if God is truly omnipotent then He can
do absolutely anything, including that which it is necessarily impossible to do. In this case the an-
titheist argument fails from the beginning. Many philosophers claim, for instance, that Descartes
holds that an omnipotent God can do absolutely anything, including that which it is necessar-
ily impossible to do. See Harry G. Frankfurt (1964), `The Logic of Omnipotence', Philosophical
Review 73, pp. 262263, Harry G. Frankfurt (1977), `Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal
Truths', Philosophical Review 86, pp. 3657, Peter Geach (1973), `Omnipotence', Philosophy 48,
pp. 720, Danny Goldstick (1990), `Gould GodMake a Contradiction True?', Religious Studies 26,
pp. 377387, Leonard G. Miller (1957), `Descartes, Mathematics, and God', Philosophical Review
66, pp. 451465, Alvin Plantinga (1980),DoesGodHave aNature?, Milwaukee,Marquett Univer-
sity Press, Nick Trakakis (1997), `The Absolute Theory of Omnipotence', Sophia 36, pp. 5578. La
Croix argues, however, that Descartes does not reallymean to contend that God can turn necessary
impossibilities into possibilities. See Richard R. La Croix (1984), `Descartes on God's Ability to Do
the Logically Impossible', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14, pp. 455475. Other philosophers
who endorse the doctrine of absolute omnipotence, according towhich if God is omnipotentHe has
to be able to do everything, including that which it is necessarily impossible to do, include: Danny
Goldstick, (1990) `Could God Make a Contradiction True?', Earl Conee (1991), `The Possibility of
Power Beyond Possibility', in James Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives: 5 Philosophy of
Religion, Atascadero, California, Ridgeview Publishing Company, J. L. Mackie (1955), `Evil and
Omnipotence', Mind 65, pp. 200212, John Ellis McTaggart (1906), Some Dogmas of Religion,
London, Edward Arnold, Leon Shestov (1962), `In Memory of a Great Philosopher: Edmund
Husserl', George L. Kline (trans.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22. In this paper I
do not attempt to provide a rigorous denition of divine omnipotence. I assume, however, for the
sake of argument, that an omnipotent God can do everything that it is possible to do and cannot
do that which it is necessarily impossible to do. And in fact, this is what both proponents and
opponents of the antitheists argument presuppose.
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2 Alter's First Objection
As a rst objection to the antitheist argument, Alter argues that even if
God Himself cannot experience fear, frustration and despair there is no reason
to conclude that He cannot possess concepts of them. For, according to Alter,
God can possess such concepts by directly perceiving the `contents of human
consciousness' (p. 51). For instance, if someone  say, in a silent prayer  reects
vividly on her/his fear, Alter says, then God will be able to perceive this person's
feeling and to come to understand fully what fear is.5
There are various difculties with this reply.6 First, what Alter takes for
granted, i.e., that God can perceive the contents of human consciousness, is con-
troversial among theists. Most notably, early Christians formulated and defended
the doctrine of divine impassibility, according to which God cannot perceive hu-
man feelings, in particular, human sufferings. This doctrine states that God, who
transcends space and time, is not in a position to share human feelings. A number
of contemporary theists endorse this doctrine.7
Second, even if the doctrine of divine impassibility is false and God can in
fact perceive human pains and sufferings, Alter's objection is still untenable on
two grounds: (i) it is unlikely that any attribute of God is dependent largely on
the experience of humans. According to Judaeo-Christian theism God is an inde-
pendent, self-existing being. That is, God is entirely self-sufcient, not dependent
upon anything or anyone outside of Himself.8 Alter's claim that God's knowledge
of fear, frustration and despair relies on the contents of human consciousness
is inconsistent with this doctrine of divine independence. (ii) According to the
Anselmian tradition, if God exists at all He is necessarily omniscient. However,
if Alter's objection is right, God's omniscience is contingent at best, since it will
largely depend upon contingent human experiences. Then Alter's objection en-
tails that the Anselmian God, who is necessarily omniscient, does not in fact exist!
5. It might be a problem if no one were to reect vividly upon their fears, but I ignore this
point for the sake of simplicity.
6. One might claim that if Alter's rst objection is right then God would not have been
omniscient before His creatures experienced, say, fear for the rst time. Alter argues that we can
block this objection if we suppose that God `created a creature experiencing fear at the instant the
universe began' and that He was `able to perceive the rst instant of that creature's experience'
(p. 51).
7. For the contemporary debate on divine impassibility see Richard E. Creel (1986), Divine
Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, Paul
S. Fiddes (1992), The Creative Suffering of God, Oxford, Clarendon Press, J. K. Mozley (1926),
The Impassibility of God, Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, Marcel Sarot (1992),God, Pas-
sibility, and Corporeality, The Netherlands, Kok Pharos Publishing House, Marcel Sarot (2001),
`Does God Suffer?: A Critical Discussion of Thomas G. Weinandy's Does God Suffer?', Ars Dis-
putandi 1 [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000018/index.html], Thomas
G.Weinandy (2000),Does God Suffer?, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, and Thomas G.Weinandy (2002),
`Does God Suffer?', Ars Disputandi 2 [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/
000023/index.html].
8. For example, the following passage in Scripture is said to describe God's independence:
`The God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and earth and does not
live in temples built by hands. And he is not served by human hands, as if he needed anything,
because he himself gives all men life and breath and everything else' (Acts 17: 2425).
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This is, for theists, as unfavourable as the conclusion of the antitheist argument
itself. Alter's rst objection is not successful.
One might claim that God comprehends fully the concepts fear, frustration
and despair by imagining or inferring what it would be like for a creature to
have experiences pertaining to them, instead of directly perceiving the contents of
human consciousness. This claim appears more compelling because in this case
God's knowledge is not dependent on contingent human experiences. This idea
leads to Alter's second objection to the antitheist argument.
3 Alter's Second Objection
As a second objection to the antitheist argument, Alter argues that even if
God cannot be directly acquainted with fear, frustration and despair themselves,
that may not preclude Him from fully understanding the concepts. For, God
can be acquainted with `components' of fear, frustration and despair and deduce
what it would be like to combine those components into states of fear, frustration
and despair without actually having the appropriate experiences (p. 52). In other
words, according to this objection, God can fully comprehend the concepts fear,
frustration and despair by imagining or inferring what it would be like for a
creature to have fear, frustration and despair.
It is not clear what exactly Alter means by components of fear, frustration
and despair.9 And, in any case, it is a matter of enormous controversy in the
philosophy of mind whether mental states such as fear, frustration and despair
are reducible to something else. Suppose though, for the sake argument, that
they are composite states and it is possible for God to understand fully what
fear, frustration and despair are by deducing what it would be like to combine
their components. However, most theists would nevertheless disagree with Alter
that God actually does so. For, according to the traditional doctrine of divine
omniscience, God's knowledge is not discursive. Thomas Aquinas describes this
doctrine as follows:
In the divine knowledge there is no discursiveness. . . . God sees all things in
one thing alone, which is Himself. Therefore, God sees all things together,
and not successively.10
Aquinas contends that God's knowledge does not involve any reasoning or
imagination. Similarly, Alvin Plantinga writes, `Of course God neither needs nor
uses logic; that is, he never comes to know a proposition A by inferring it from
proposition B.'11 This means that God knows (if He knows at all) fear, frustration
9. As candidates for components of fear, frustration and despair, Alter suggests `qualia that
tend to accompany (or partially constitute) those mental states' (p. 52). But without a further
argument it is hard to see how they could actually be components of fear, frustration and despair.
10. Summa Theologiae, I, 14. Thomas Aquinas (Anton C. Pegis ed.) (1997), Basic Writings
of Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume One, Indianapolis, Hackett, p. 416.
11. Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?, p. 144. Mavrodes also writes, `[The doctrine
according to which God's knowledge is discursive] has not been popular among Christian philoso-
phers and theologians. I can think of no one who has positively defended this doctrine, and several
seem to have explicitly denied it'. George I. Mavrodes (1988), `How Does God Know the Things
He Knows', in Thomas V. Morris ed., Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of
Theism, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, pp. 345361, see especially p. 346.
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and despair just as they are.
Thus, even if Alter can prove that in principle God can know discursively
what fear, frustration and despair are, which, by itself, seems extremely difcult
to do, that does not satisfymost Judaeo-Christian theists. Alter's second objection
is not successful.
4 Alter's Third Objection
Alter's nal objection to the antitheist argument is the following. Again,
because of His omnipotence, Godmight not be able to experience fear, frustration
and despair. However, He can come fully to comprehend the concepts fear,
frustration and despair by creating false memory traces of relevant experiences.
In order to motivate his claim Alter invites us to imagine the following scenario
(p. 54). Suppose that I have never seen red, but one night, while I am asleep, a
neurosurgeon operates onmy brain so that it is in the state it would have been, had
I seen red. Then, thanks to this false memory trace created by the neurosurgeon
I know exactly what it is like to see red without actually having experienced red.
Similarly, Alter contends, God can come fully to understand the concepts fear,
frustration and despair by creating a false memory trace of relevant experiences
for Himself without actually having those experiences.
Again, there are a number of problems with this objection. The rst, obvious
problem is that the case of false memory trace makes sense only if the agent
at issue has a physical body, because the case of false memory trace is based
on the assumption that one's mental states are at least correlated with her/his
physical states; in particular, brain states. However, according to traditional
Judaeo-Christian theismGod is incorporeal. That is, unlike us, God does not have
relevant physical states at all.12 The above brain surgery case is plausible because
we can suppose that counterfactually, I have seen red and that a neurosurgeon can,
in principle, bring about the brain state that I would have been in had I seen red by
operating on my brain. However, in the case of God, opponents of the antitheist
argument, like Alter, are not allowed simply to make a parallel supposition that
counterfactually, God has been in fear, frustration and despair; because that is the
very thesis that the antitheist argument denies. Stipulating this thesis begs the
question against the antitheist argument.
At this point one might contend that Alter is not suggesting that God creates
false memory trace in the way neurosurgeon creates it, but merely that the con-
ceivability of our false memory trace case opens up a possibility that God can also
comprehend fully the concept fear, frustration and despair without having rele-
vant experiences. However, rejecting the antitheist argument in this way is very
weak. For this is equivalent to rejecting, on the grounds of mere speculation, the
thesis of concept empiricism on which the antitheist argument is based, without
12. One might argue that this is not a problem for theists because God can incarnate.
However, it is still difcult to think that God's incarnation is a necessary condition for His full
understanding of such concepts as fear, frustration and despair. Even if God can know, in
principle, what fear, frustration and despair are by incarnating that cannot be the way He in fact
comes to know them.
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specifying exactly how God can fully comprehend the concepts with no relevant
experiences.
Second, having a false memory trace seems to entail having a false belief
about a past experience, but it is widely agreed that God does not have false
beliefs.13 The thrust of the doctrine of divine omniscience is that God knows,
roughly speaking, everything (or everything knowable). However, it is important
to note that this doctrine comes with the proviso that God does not have false
beliefs. If God is omniscient then surely it has to be the case that He has such a
true belief as, say, a triangle is three-sided, but it also has to be the case that God
does not have such a false belief as, say, a triangle is ve-sided; for otherwise God
would have such an inconsistent belief as that a triangle is both three-sided and
not three-sided. Hence, it is a mistake to think that God has a number of false
beliefs about past experiences for the purpose of possessing concepts like fear,
frustration and despair. Alter's third objection is, again, unsuccessful.
One might reject my objection by claiming that Alter's argument does not
require God to have false beliefs about His past experiences, for it is perfectly
possible that while God has false memory traces regarding His past experiences
He nevertheless knows that they are false.14 There are two points to bemade here.
First, even if God is aware that His memory traces are false it does not follow that
Goddoes not have false beliefs onwhich falsememory traces are based. For having
false beliefs is one thing and knowing that these beliefs are false is another thing.
One can believe falsely that p while knowing that p is false. Second, moreover, it
is not entirely clear that one can have false memory traces without having a single
false belief. In order to vindicate Alter's third objection, one needs to show that
false memory traces do not involve false beliefs at all.
5 Conclusion
Alter argues that his objections `are consistent with the principal divine
attributes' (pp. 47, 48). However, I have shown the contrary. His rst objection is
inconsistent with the doctrines of divine impassibility and divine independence.
His second objection is inconsistent with the doctrine of divine omniscience. His
third objection is inconsistent with the doctrines of divine incorporeality and
divine omniscience.
The simplest way for Alter to undercut my criticisms is to reject those
doctrines. However, given that they have widely been accepted among Judaeo-
Christian theists for hundreds of years, or more, Alter faces an uphill struggle.15
13. For instance, Patrick Grim contends that the following simple denition of omniscience
is insufcient because it allows God to have `any number of false beliefs': x is omniscient =df for all
p, p is true IFF x knows that p. Patrick Grim (1983), `Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience',
American Philosophical Quarterly 20, 265276. See especially p. 265. Similarly, Richard Gale
denes an omniscient being as one `who knows all and believes only true propositions'. Richard
M. Gale (1991),On the Nature of Existence of God, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 57.
14. In fact Alter himself writes, `In the case of God, the label false memory trace is
potentially misleading, since God would be fully aware that the relevant memories don't trace
back to fear-experience' (p. 54).
15. I would like to thank Torin Alter, William Hasker, Daniel Stoljar and an anonymous
referee for Ars Disputandi for their helpful comments.
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